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THE THREAT OF MATERIAL
INJURY STANDARD IN
COUNTERVAILING DUTY ENFORCEMENT

One purpose o f passage of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 war to
bring U.S. countervailing duty and antidumping law into conformity
with the comparable laws of G A T T trading partners by raising the
standard required for enforcement action by the International Trade
Commission. While the "material injury"standard adopted in the Act
had its origins in the G A TT, the standard was also injuenced by other
international agreements, as well as the history of U.S. countervailing
duty law and its application by the I T C - sources which were often inconsistent, fi not contradictory. The 'threat of material injury"standard
was particularly difficult to interpret because it was not separately
defined from material injury in the Act and, unlike the definition of
material injury, it did not require a showing of measurable injury to a
domestic industry. The statutory vagueness of the threat standard
troubled critics who felt it would be an unmanageable and ineffective
guideline for enforcement action. The author argues, however, that an
examination of I T C decisions under this standard demonstrates not only that the standard is intelligible but also that it provides an adequate
guide for a coherent, predictable, and supportable enforcement policy
which is consistent with the G A T T .
Subtitle IV of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (TAA)' defines
B.A., University of Pennsylvania (1971); M.A., London School of Economics and
Political Science (1972); J.D., Georgetown University Law Center (1976); member of the
Washington, D.C. firm of Santarelli and Bond. The Author extends his gratitude to
Waltraut Susanne Addy for her substantial contribution to the underlying research for this
article.
1. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Title I, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979), now
codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1671 et seq. (1982). The Trade Agreements Act was enacted to implement the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Reached During the
1979 Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN), General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Interpretations and Applications of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII, done
April 12,1979,31 U.S.T. 513,T.I.A.S. 9619,U.N.T.S. Reg. No. 814, LXXXVIUuly 1,
1980) [hereinafter cited as Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement], reprinted in
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the enforcement authority of the United States International Trade
Commission (Commission) to impose countervailing or antidumping duties upon foreign exporters2 who are signatories to the Subsidies and Countervailing Duties Code negotiated during the Tokyo
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN).3 The TAA
authorizes such duties when the Commission finds that sales in the
United States, either aided by foreign subsidies or made at less than
fair value (LTFV), materially injure, threaten to materially injure,
or materially retard establishment of an industry in the United

state^.^
AGREEMENTS
REACHED
I N THE TOKYO
ROUND
OF THE MULTILATERAL
TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS,
H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 257 (1979) [hereinafter cited as MTA].
2. Id. "[Tlhe term 'countervailing duty' shall be understood to mean a special duty levied
for the purpose of offsetting any bounty or subsidy bestowed, directly or indirectly, upon the
manufacture, production, or export of any merchandise." General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, openedfor signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S.
187, Art. VI, para. 3 [hereinafter cited as GATT).
1671(b)(l)-(2)(1982). The countervailing duty provisions under the
3. 19 U.S.C.
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 apply as well to certain non-GATT member countries with
which the United States exchanges most favored nation preferences. 19 U.S.C. 5
167l(b)(3). Sees. REP.NO. 249,96th Cong., 1st Sess. 45, reprintedin ~ ~ ~ ~ U . S . C O D E C O N G .
c AD. NEWS381 [hereinafter cited as SENATE
REPORTNO. 2491; Barcelo, Subsidies, Countervailing Duties and Antidumping A@ the Tokyo Round, 13 CORNELL
INT'LL.J. 257, 269 & n.59
(1980).
4. 19 U.S.C. $5 1671, 1673 (1982). The pertinent portions ofsections 1671 and 1673 provide:
(a) General rule. If (1) the administering authority determines that (A) a country under the Agreement, or
(B) a person who is a citizen or national of such a country, or a corporation,
association, or other organization organized in such a country, is providing, directly or indirectly, a subsidy with respect to the manufacture, production, or exportation of a class or
kind of merchandise imported into the United States, and
(2) the Commission determines that (A) an industry in the United States (i) is materially injured, or (ii) is threatened with material injury, or
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded, by
reason of imports of that merchandise,
then there shall be imposed upon such merchandise a countervailing duty, in addition to
any other duty imposed, equal to the amount of the net subsidy.
19 U.S.C. § 1671(a).
8 . 8

[Vol. 16:373

Heinonline - - 16 Law & Pol'y

Int'l Bus. 374 1984

C V D T H R E A T STANDARD

Of the three possible factual findings of injury, the first, material
injury, and the third, material retardation, expressly require current, palpable, and measurable injury to an actual or anticipated
domestic industry.5 The standard for a finding of a threat of material
injury, however, is far more difficult to define and thus is the most
susceptible to varying interpretation. It has even been suggested by
some responsible for administering the countervailing duty laws
that the threat of material injury standard is at least opaque and
perhaps unintelligible.6 I n fact, a review of the statutory criteria
found in the TAA, together with the legislative history and Commis,~
that affirmative
sion determinations based on this ~ t a n d a r d shows
determination of threat of material injury requires somewhat less
factual proof than does a finding of actual material injury, and
somewhat more than sheer speculation.
The purpose of this article is to address and attempt to resolve two
issues: (1) whether the threat of material injury standard has been
the subject of coherent enforcement by the Commission, and (2)
whether Commission interpretation and enforcement of the threat
of material injury provision can be read consistently with the expressed purpose of U.S. participation in the 1979 Tokyo Round- to
reconcile U . S. countervailing duty enforcement with the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing measure^.^
If(1) the administering authority determines that a class or kind of foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at less than its fair
value, and
(2) the Commission determines that (A) an industry in the United States - (i) is materially injured, o r (ii) is
threatened with material injury, or
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded, by reason of imports of that merchandise,
then there shall be imposed upon such merchandise an antidumping duty, in addition to
any other duty imposed, in an amount equal to the amount by which the foreign market
value exceeds the United States price for the merchandise.
Id. § 1673.
5 . Seegenerally SENATE
REPORT
NO. 249, supra note 3, at 38,86-87 (discussing the concrete
indicia of injury required by the TAA).
6. See Greenwald, U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing D u p Laws: Material Injury, F E D . BAR
ASS'NJ . 38-40 Uan. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Greenwald]. Mr. Greenwald was, until May
1981, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Import Administration.
7. See infra notes 39-73, 76-201 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Note, I m p l m t i n g "Tokyo Round" Commitments: The New Injury Standard in
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T o this end, the article first will review the pre-TAA antidumping
and countervailing duty enforcement prerogatives of the Commission under the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the Trade Act of
1974.9 Next the article briefly will describe U.S. participation in the
1979 Tokyo Round M T N and the agreements which were reached
pursuant to the 1979 Trade Act. Comparable antidumping and
countervailing duty provisions of the MTN Agreements on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, together with interpretative
statements, then will be discussed. There will follow a description of
the provisions and legislative history of the TAA that relate to the
evaluation of a threat of material injury under such provisions.
The article will argue that the answer to the questions posed by
discussion of the two issues raised above is yes, and that it is possible
to identify coordinates that will permit proper definition of the
threat standard in Commission antidumping and countervailing duty enforcement. T h e article will conclude that an examination of
Commission countervailing duty and antidumping determinations,
relying in whole or in part upon the threat of material injury standard, shows that the Commission's interpretation of the threat of
material injury standard has been sufficiently precise and focused so
as to provide meaningful guidance to the Commission, domestic
producers, and foreign exporters.'O

Pre- TAA Countervailing Duty Enforcement
The dual concepts of material injury and threat of material injury
were first enunciated in the GATT, which was opened for signature
in 1947, and which stated in pertinent part that no contracting
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, 32 STAN.L. REV.1183, 1192-93 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Tobo Round Injury Standard]; see supra note 1 .
9. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976), amended by 19 U.S.C. 1303 (1982).
10. Due to the relatively small number of Commission determinations that analyze the
countervailing duty threat of material injury standard, this article, by necessity, will also
focus upon Commission determinations of the TAA antidumping provisions. The TAA's
antidumping and countervailing duty "threat of material injuryn standards are identical. See
19 U.S.C. $5 1671, 1673 (1982); see also infra notes 36-73 and accompanying text for a
comparison of the standards.
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party could levy countervailing duties without a determination that
the effect of the subsidization "is such as to cause or threaten material
injury to an established domestic industry, . . ."1 1
Before the MTN Agreements, U. S. countervailing duty law,
which antedated the GATT, was not bound by the G A T T material
injury requirement by virtue of a grandfather clause in the GATT
Protocol of Provisional Application.'* Accordingly, prior to the
Trade Act of 1974, the United States was permitted to countervail
foreign exports upon a finding of foreign "subsidy" or "bounty," even
if a domestic industry was not threatened with injury.13 Moreover,
prior to 1974, U.S. countervailing duties were applied only to
dutiable goods.14

The Trade Act of 1974
The 1974 Trade Act was intended to remedy shortcomings in congressional implementation of the Antidumping Code of 1967,15providing the then-current interpretation of the antidumping and
countervailing duty provisions of GATT Article VI, including the
threat of material injury standard of Article VI (6Xa),16 and to
harmonize U.S. countervailing duty law with the GATT. Imperfections in 1968 congressional legislation had directed the Commission
to disregard the GATT material injury standard which had been
agreed to by U.S. negotiators at the Kennedy Round, and to
employ instead a continuation of the prior de minimis standard used

11. G A I T , supra note 1, Art. VI (6)(a).
12. The GATT Protocol of Provisional Application, signed Oct. 30, 1947, exempts from
the GATT rules legislation "existing" at the time of signature. Protocol of Provisional Application of the [GATT], Art. 1, para. (b), 61 Stat. A2051 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 308. See Rivers & Greenwald, The Negotiation ofa Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duly Measures: Bridging Fundamental Policy Da&nces, 11 LAWa POL'YI N T 'BUS.
~
1447,
1453 & n.29, 1457 & n.52 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Rivers & Greenwald].
13. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (amended by 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982)). See
generally Comment, United States Countervailing Duty Law: Revised, Revamped, and Revisited, 17
a COM.L. REV.832 (1976); Rivers &Greenwald, supra note 12, at 1453; Note,
B.C. INDUS.
Subsidies and Countervailing Duties Under the Trade Act of 1979, 1980 N.C .J. INT'LLAWA N D
COMM.REG. 533, 541-42.
14. Note, supra note 13, at 541.
15. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT, doneJune 30,1967, 19 U.S.T.
4348, T.I.A.S. No. 6431.
16. GATT, supra note 1, Art. VI (6)(a).
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to determine injury to domestic industry." In a key U.S. concession
considered by U . S. trading partners to be vital to U.S. participation
s,
bound
in the then-upcoming Tokyo ~ o u n d ' n e ~ o t i a t i o nCongress
itself to vote promptly u p or down on each M T N agreement reached
without proposing amendments.18
In an incomplete, but substantial, step towards conforming U . S.
countervailing duty law with the G A T T , the Trade Act of 1974 extended countervailing duty enforcement to nondutiable and dutiable goods alike, and adopted an "injury" test roughly similar to the
GATT standard.19 T h e injury test adopted in the 1974 Act required
the domestic producer of a like or directly competitive product to
show that it was "being or was likely to be injured" by reason of importation of such product.20 T h e Senate Report stated, however,
that the intent of Congress was that the definition of injury be "un~ ~of a conqualified by adjectives such as 'material' or ' s e r i o ~ s , "out
cern that the term "material" as understood in U.S. law suggested a
measurably higher standard of injury than that understood by the
GATT signatories or by then-accepted countervailing duty practice
of U.S. trading partners.22
The 1974 Act did not define the term injury, but the Act
nonetheless did ,require that actual or potential countervailable
harm not be "frivolous, inconsequential, insignificant, or immaterial.'23 Economic indicia of such otherwise undefined "injury"
included import penetration, price suppression or depression, and
domestic employment, profits, and capacity utilization.24 Under
17. Renegotiation Amendments Act of 1968,Pub. L. No. 90-634, Title 11, § 201, 82
Stat. 1347 (1968) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1976)); S. REP.NO. 1385, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess., 2, 4 (1968); see Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 12, at 1457.
18. 19 U.S.C. 5 2191(d) (1976); S. REP. NO. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 109 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODECONG.& AD. NEWS7255 [hereinafter cited as SENATE
REPORT
No. 12981; see Tokyo Round Injury Standard, supra note 8, at 1186.
REPORT
NO. 1298, supra note 18, at 180.
19. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 et seq.; SENATE
REPORT
NO. 1298, supra note 18, at 180; see TAA
20. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(b)(l)(A); SENATE
Material Injury Standard, supra note 11, at 90-91 & n.31.
21. SENATE
REPORT
NO. 1298, supra note 18, at 180.
I U.S. CUSTOMS
AND
22. See Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 12, at 1456; seeafso FELLER,
INTERNATIONAL
TRADE
GUIDE§ 18.06 [2] (1979).
NO. 249, Supra note 3, at 90-91 .;SENATE
REPORT
NO. 1298, supra
23. SeeSENATE REPORT
note 18, at 180.
24. See Impression Fabric of Manmade Fiber From Japan, Inv. No. AA1921-176,
USITC Pub. No. 872, at 4-6 (1978).
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this standard, the Commission was able to find a likelihood or threat
of injury in situations where, for example, petitioners showed
domestic price suppression and lost sales even in the absence of
significant market penetration by the allegedly subsidized goods.z5
In exchange for entering into the Tokyo Round MTN, the
United States received the commitment of its GATT trading partners to exert greater control over export-related subsidies that were
perceived to offer foreign exporters an unfair advantage over U.S.
industry.26 The other GATT members further committed themselves to the preparation of a list of those "export" subsidies conceded
by all to be most deleterious to industries of the importing nations.27
The U.S. concomitant obligation was to adopt a "material injuryn
standard in countervailing duty determinations against dutiable and
nondutiable goods alike.28 With this final undertaking the United
States obligated itself to a material injury and threat of material injury countervailing duty enforcement practice that could, at last, be
reconciled with the GATT standard set thirty years before.
Adoption of the material injury and the threat of material injury
standards of the TAA by Congress in 1979 was intended to bring
U.S. countervailing duty and antidumping law into conformity
with the MTN Agreements successfully concluded earlier that

25. Id.; see also Chromic Acid From Australia, Inv. No. AA 192 1-32, T . C . Pub. No. 121
(1964).
REPORTNO. 249, supra note 3, at 40-41; Rivers & Greenwald, supra note
26. See SENATE
12, at 1454-55.
27. See Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, supra note 1, Annex, reprinted
in M T A at 275 (listing types of export subsidies); see also Tokyo Round Injury Standard, supra
note 8 , at 1192. In committing to enter the Tokyo Round negotiations, the Senate Finance
Committee stated its expectation that ". . . any negotiated concession by the United States to
extend the injury requirement to dutiable items. . . would be compensated for by concessions of equivalent value by foreign nations." SENATE
REPORTNO. 1298, supra note 18, at
185.
28. SENATE
REPORTNO. 249, supra note 3, at 36, 39 confirms that the "material injury"
tests in U.S. trade laws, adopted in the TAA, implement the Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures Agreement, supra note 1, and the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of
the GATT, done April 8, 1979, reprinted in MTA, supra note 1, at 3. See Implementation of the
Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int9 Trade of the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 M T N Hearings].
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year.29 The point of departure for congressional consideration of
U.S. adherence to a "material injury" test was the GATT definition
of the circumstances under which a participating nation may impose
countervailing duties.30 In adopting the material injury and threat
of material injury language of GATT Article VI, Congress expressly rejected the assignment of a de minimis standard to this language; it
spoke clearly that countervailable injury or threat of injury under
U.S. law and by implication should be interpreted by U.S. trading
partners to mean "harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial,
or unimportant." 3 l

GA TT Provisions
Article VI of the GATT provides that "[nlo contracting party
shall levy any . . . countervailing duty upon the importation of any
product of the territory of another contracting party unless it determines that the effect of the. . . subsidization. . . is such as to cause or
threaten material injury to an established domestic industry, or is
such as to retaid materially the establishment of a domestic industry." 32 By signing the MTN Agreements, the United States
expressly bound itself to an interpretation of "injury" consistent
with Article VI.33
Article 6 of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement merges the definitions of injury and threat of injury by stating

29. See Murphy, Antidumping and CountervailingDuties Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979:
A Preliminary Analysis, 14 INT'LLAW.203 (1980); Note, supra note 13, at 533-34; Rivers &
Greenwald, supra note 12, at 1450 & n. 1 1 .
30. SENATE
REPORTNO. 1298, supra note 18, at 74; see Tokyo Round Znjuty Standard, supra
note 8, at 1186-87; GATT, supra note 1 , Art. VI.
31. REPORTOF THE HOUSECOMMITTEE
ON WAYS
AND MEANS
TO ACCOMPANY
H.R. 4537,
H . R. Rep. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1979) [hereinafter cited as HOUSEREPORT
No. 3171.
32. Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, supra note 1 , Art. VI, reprinted in
MTA, supra note 1 , at 272.
33. The Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement of the MTN states:
Under this Agreement, the term injury shall, unless otherwise specified, be taken
to mean injury to a domestic industry, threat of injury to a domestic industry, or
material retardation of the establishment of such an industry and shall be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of [GATT] Article VI.
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2 n.6, reprinted in
MTA at 262 n. 1 .

380
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that the determinations of injury and threat of injury alike must be
made by an "objective examination of both (a) the volume of subsidized exports and their effect on prices in the domestic market for
like products, and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on
domestic producers of such products.'q* Article 6 further states that
threat of material injury determinations contemplate reference to
factors identical to those relevant to material injury evaluation, but
also may include review of "evidence on the nature of the subsidy in
question and the trade effects likely to arise therefr~m.'"~

Definition of the Threat of Material Injury Under the T A A
The countervailing duty provisions of the TAA require the Commission to determine whether, by virtue of alleged foreign subsidization, an industry in the United States is materially injured or
threatened with material injury, or whether the initiation of an identifiable industry is materially retarded.36 The TAA defines material
injury as harm which is not "inconsequential, immaterial, or unimp ~ r t a n t , " and
~ does not provide a separate definition of threat of
material injury. The legislative history of these injury definitions
states that the material injury and threat of material injury standards are to be interpreted in a manner "consistent with the analogous
criterion of the MTN Agreement Relating to Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures. . . .,338

Threshold for Determination of Threat of Injury
The statute reflects language from the House and Senate Reports,
which states that material injury should be defined as "harm which is
not inconsequential, immaterial, or u n i m p ~ r t a n t . 'A
~ ~Commission finding of threat of material injury must be grounded upon

34. Id., para. 1 .
3 5 . Id. at n.17; see 19 U.S.C § 1677(7)(E)(i) (1982).
36. 19 U.S.C. $9 1671(a), 1671d(b) (1982).
37. Id. § 1677(7)(A).
38. SENATE
REPORT
NO. 249, supra note 3, at 87.
REPORT
NO. 317, supra note 31,
39. SENATE
REPORT
NO. 249, supra note 3, at 18; HOUSE
at 46.
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"information showing that the threat is real and injury is imminent,
not a mere supposition or conjecture,"40 adding that the Commission should "consider the likelihood of actual material injury occurring."el The Senate authors admitted, however, that some U.S.
trading partners might view the "not inconsequential" language as
representing a lower injury threshold than is contained in the

GATT. 42
The House Report posits a very low threshold for affirmative
Commission preliminary determinations of material injury or threat
thereof, stating that " 'a reasonable indication will exist in each case
in which the facts reasonably indicate that an industry. . .could
possibly be suffering material injury, threat thereof, or material
retardation."43
The prophylactic nature of the threat of material injury standard
is evidenced by the Senate Report's statement that the purpose of the
statutory language is to permit Commission intercession "before actual injury occursn with remedies administered "so as to prevent
actual injury from occurring."4* Commission countervailing duty
sanctions should not be delayed, the Report adds, where "sufficient
evidence exists for concluding that the threat of injury is real and injury is imminent."45
40. Id. at 88-89.
41. Id. at 88.
42. The 1979 Senate Report states:
The committee is aware that some major trading partners are concerned that particular elements of this bill do not repeat the precise language of the agreements.
This bill is drafted with the intent to permit U.S. [trade] practice to be consistent
with the obligations of the agreements, as the United States understands those obligations. The bill implements the United States['] understanding of those obligations.
SENATE
REPORT
NO. 249, supra note 3, at 36 (emphasis added).
43. HOUSEREPORT
NO. 31 7 , supra note 31, at 52 (emphasis added).
44. SENATE
REPORT
NO. 249, supra note 3, at 88-89.
45. Id. at 89. This article will examine both Preliminary Determinations and Final Determinations of the Commission as germane to understanding the threat of material injury
standard. The TAA authorizes an affirmative Preliminary Determination upon a showing
to the Commission of a "reasonable indicationnof such a threat, 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(a), while
a Final Determination requires a showing unmodified by such "reasonable indication"
language, id. § 1671d(b).
That the "reasonable indicationn language for a Preliminary Determination suggests a
lower standard of proof than that required for an affirmative Final Determination is

382
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Statutory Economic Factors
The statute directs that the Commission should advert to identical
factors in assessing both the existence and threat of material injury
in countervailing duty cases, and instructs the Commission to consider, among other factors, three specific indicia: (1) the volume of
imports, (2) the effect of such imports upon prices of "like" domestic
products, and (3) the "impact" of such imports upon domestic producers of such products.46
With respect to the evaluation of volume of imports, the TAA requires the commission to consider whether export volume, or increases thereof, "either in absolute terms or relative to production or
Regarding both
consumption in the United States" is "~ignificant."~'
domestic and imported article prices, the Commission must consider any "significant price undercutting" by the imports, or "significant " depression or stabilizing of domestic prices by virtue of such
importation.48 Lastly, in evaluating the impact on a domestic industry, the TAA further directs the Commission to evaluate "all
relevant economic factors which have a bearing on the state of the
industry."49 The House Report includes as relevant economic
factors "production, sales, market share, profits, productivity,
return on investments, capacity, utilization, cash flow, inventories,
employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital, and investment ."50
Referencing the volume, price, and impact criteria of the TAA,S1
confirmed by the Court of International Trade in Republic Steel Corp. v. United States,
No. 82-03-00372 (Slip Op., July 11, 1984), in which the court wrote:
[Tlhe Court is persuaded that just as the meaningfulness of the law depends on a
low threshold for a reasonable determination of actual material injury, it depends
on a low threshold for a reasonable indication of threat of injury. Moreover,
because the evidence needed to support the indication of threat is more difficult to
obtain than evidence of actual injury, it is reasonable to predicate the need for further investigation of a threat [that is, by an affirmative Preliminary Determination] on the barest indications.

Id.
46. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B)(i)-(iii).
47. Id. § 1677(7)(C)(i).
48. Id. § 1677(7)(C)(ii).
49. Id. § 1677(7)(C)(iii);see SENATE
REPORTNO. 249, supra note 3, at 86-87.
NO. 31 7, supra note 31, at 47.
50. HOUSEREPORT
51. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(i)-(iii) (1982).
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the Senate Report recognizes that for one domestic industry an "apparently small" volume of imports may have a "significant impact"
on the domestic market, while for another, the same volume of imports might not be significant.52 Similarly, in one industry an imported product's subsidy-related small price differential might be inconsequential, while in another industry the identical price difference could be "decisive." 53 The Commission has the discretion to
assign significance to any particular economic factor.54
52. SENATE
REPORT
NO. 249, supra note 3, at 88.
53. Id.
54. See id. As this article was in preparation for printing, the Ninety-Eighth Congress
passed H.R. 3398. Title VI of this bill amends certain provisions of the countervailing duty
laws, including the threat of material injury standard. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 3398, H.R. REP. NO. 98-1156, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
173-75 (ordered to be printed Oct. 5, 1984)(passed House and Senate on Oct. 9, 1984).
The conference-passed language adds criteria the Commission "must" consider in determining "whether there is a probability the merchandise (whether or not actually being imported at the time) will be the cause of actual injury. . . ." Certain "demonstrable adverse
trend[s]" to be examined by the Commission include:
[I] an increase in production capacity in the exporting country likely to result in a
significant increase in exports of the merchandise to the United States;
[2] a rapid increase in the U.S. market penetration and the probability such
penetration will increase to an injurious level;
[3] the probability that imports will enter at prices that will have a depressing or
suppressing effect on domestic prices [;I
[4] a substantial increase in inventories in the United States;
[5] the presence of underutilized capacity for producing the merchandise in the
exporting country; [or]
[6] the potential for product shifting of production facilities owned or controlled by
foreign manufacturers which can be used to produce products subject to [antidumping] as [countervailing duty] investigations or final orders are also used to
produce the merchandise under investigation.

Id. at 174. The conferees explain the rationale for these amendments with the observation
that:
The projection of future events is necessarily more difficult than the evaluation of
current data. Accordingly, a determination of threat will require a careful assessment of identifiable current trends and competitive conditions in the marketplace.
This will require the ITC to conduct a thorough, practical, and realistic evaluation of how it operates, the role of imports in the market, the rate of increase of unfairly traded imports, and their probable future impact on the industry.

Id. at 174-75.
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Nonstatutoy Economic Fators

The Senate and House reports to the 1979 TAA are replete with
directives and admonitions to the Commission regarding what additional nonstatutory factors should be considered in determining
material injury and threat of material injury cases.
Demonstrable Trends

The 1979 report from the House Committee on Ways and Means
states that a positive determination of a threat of material injury requires a finding of a "likelihood of a particular situation developing
5 ~ Report also recommends that the
into actual material i n j ~ r y . " This
Commission examine "demonstrable trends," including (1) "the rate
of increase of subsidized exports to the U.S. market," (2) the "capacity in the exporting country to generate exports," (3) "the availability
of other export markets," and (4) "the nature of the subsidy in question."='jWith respect to the second factor above, the House Report
states that high domestic capacity utilization is not, standing alone,
conclusive of threat of a material injury, and adds that the Commission should emphasize evidence of increases in market penetration,
"particularly if market penetration is achieved by prices that are
below domestic price level^."^'
Both the House and Senate clearly intended that the nature of an
alleged subsidization affect the Commission's evaluation of "threat
of material injury."5* The Commission is directed to consider
subsidy-related evidence uncovered in the course of Commerce
Department proceedings, "particularly [when] the subsidy is an export subsidy inconsistent with the Subsidies and Countervailing
55. HOUSEREPORTNO. 317, supra note 31, at 47.
56. Id. One recent determination of the Commission offers a helpful shorthand reference
to the trends the Commission will consider. In Certain Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and
Tubes From the Republic of Korea, Inv. No. 701-TA-168 (Final), USITC Pub. No. 1345
REP. DEC.(BNA) 2463, the Commission summariz(Feb. 1983), reprinted in 4 INT'LTRADE
ed: "factors which may contribute to a determination of threat of injury. . . include the ability of the foreign producers to increase their exports to the United States, any increase in
U.S. importers' inventories of the product, and increasing trends in the quantity of imports
and U.S. market penetration." Id. at 2479.
NO. 31 7, supra note 31, at 47. These factors have been summarized by
57. HOUSEREPORT
the Commission in its interpretive regulations at 19 C.F.R. 5 207.26 (d)(l)-(3) (1983).
REPORTNO. 249, supra note 3, at 89.
58. See 19 U.S.C. 1677(7)(E)(i); see also SENATE
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Measures Agreement.*59The Senate Report singles out such sub59. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(E)(i). The ability of the commission to take cognizance of
foreign domestic subsidies having a pernicious effect upon U.S. industry was an additional
part of the bargain by which the United States endorsed the Tokyo Round Agreements. See
HOUSEREPORTNO. 317, supra note 31, at 43; see also Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 2, 6, 8, 11, reprinted in MTA at 261, 272, 277, 279.
The TAA defines both "exportn and "domesticn subsidies. "Domesticn subsidies "provided
or required by government actionn include:
(i) The provision of capital, loans, or loan guarantees on terms inconsistent with
commercial considerations[;] (ii) The provision of goods or services at preferential
rates[;] (iii) The grant of funds or forgiveness of debt to cover operating losses sustained by a specific industry[; and] (iv) The assumption of any costs or expenses of
manufacture, production, or distribution.
19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B).
"Export subsidies" are those described in Annex A to the Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures Agreement. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A). Annex A sets out an "Illustrative List of Export Subsidies:"
(a) The provision by governments of direct subsidies to a firm or an industry contingent upon export performance.
(b) Currency retention schemes or any similar practices which involve a bonus on
exports.
(c) Internal transport and freight charges on export shipments, provided or mandated by governments, on terms more favourable than for domestic shipments.
(d) The delivery by governments or their agencies of imported or domestic products or services for use in the production of exported goods, on terms or conditions more favourable than for delivery of like or directly competitive products or
services for use on the production of goods for domestic consumption, if (in the
case of products) such terms or conditions are more favourable than those commercially available on world markets to their exporters.
(e) The full or partial exemption, remission, or deferral specifically related to exports, of direct taxes or social welfare charges paid o r payable by industrial or
commercial enterprises.

(0 The allowance of special deductions directly related to exports or export performance, over and above those granted in respect to production for domestic consumption, in the calculation of the base on which direct taxes are charged.
(g) The exemption or remission in respect of the production and distribution of exported products, of indirect taxes in excess of those levied in respect of the production and distribution of like products when sold for domestic consumption.
(h) The exemption, remission or deferral of prior stage cumulative indirect taxes
on goods or services used in the production of exported products in excess of the
exemption, remission or deferral of like prior stage cumulative indirect taxes on
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sidies as "inherently more likely to threaten injury than are other
subsidies,'"O while the House Report refers more broadly to appropriate Commission evaluation of whether a particular subsidy is
of "the sort that is likely to generate exports to the United States.'"'
goods or services used in the production of like products when sold for domestic
consumption; provided, however, that prior stage cumulative indirect taxes may
be exempted, remitted or deferred on exported products even when not exempted, remitted or deferred on like products when sold for domestic consumption, if
the prior stage cumulative indirect taxes are levied on goods that are physically incorporated (making normal allowance for waste) in the exported product.
(i) The remission or drawback of import charges in excess of those levied on imported goods that are physically incorporated (making normal allowance for
waste) in the exported product; provided, however, that in particular cases a firm
may use a quantity of home market goods equal to, and having the same quality
and characteristics as, the imported goods as a substitute for them in order to
benefit from this provision if the import and the corresponding export operations
both occur within a reasonable time period, normally not to exceed two years.
(j) The provision by governments (or special institutions controlled by governments) of export credit guarantee or insurance programmes, of insurance or
guarantee programmes against increases in the costs of exported products or ofexchange risk programmes, at premium rates, which are manifestly inadequate to
cover the long-term operating costs and losses of the programmes.
(k) The grant by governments (or special institutions controlled by andlor acting
under the authority of governments) of export credits at rates below those which
they actually have to pay for the funds so employed (or would have to pay if they
borrowed on international capital markets in order to obtain funds of the same
maturity and denominated in the same currency as the export credit), or the payment by them of all or part of the costs incurred by exporters or financial institutions in obtaining credits, in so far as they are used to secure a material advantage
in the field of export credit terms.
Provided, however, that if a signatory is a party to an international undertaking
on official export credits to which at least twelve original signatories to this Agreement are parties as of 1 January 1979 (or a successor undertaking which has been
adopted by those original signatories), or if in practice a signatory applies the interest rates provisions of the relevant undertaking, an export credit practice which
is in conformity with those provisions shall not be considered an export subsidy
prohibited by this Agreement.
(1) Any other charge on the public account constituting an export subsidy in the
sense of Article XVI of the General Agreement.
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, supra note 1 , Annex A, reprinted in
MTA at 295 (notes omitted).
60. SENATE
REPORTNO. 249, supra note 3, at 89.
61. HOUSEREPORTNO. 317, supra note 31, at 47; see generally i n f a notes 169-176 and
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Special Areas of Concern
The Senate directed the Commission in its investigation of claimed threat of injury to "focus on the conditions of trade and competition and the nature of the particular industry in each casen because
rapid increases in market penetration may suggest threat of injury in
some instances but not in others.b2 For example, where the affected
domestic industry produces a product entailing substantial research
and development costs and having a limited market life, increased
market penetration by foreign exports "may be a particularly appropriate early warning signal."63
The Senate also singled out economic indicators associated with
the purchase and sale of agricultural products for special attention
Due to the cyclical nature of agricultural proby the Commi~sion.6~
duction, ordinarily reliable economic indicia may be distorted to
suggest the vitality of agricultural industry when in fact the opposite
is true. The report cites the livestock industry as an example, where
gross sales and employment in beef production may rise as a consequence of poor economic condition^.^^ Further recognition is given
to the fact that government agricultural price support programs tend
to dislocate ordinary economic measurements because price supports mask domestic price suppression by preventing the imports
from "diminishing the amount received by a farmer below a
minimum support

Causation
Commission enforcement of the TAA has yet to resolve the question of whether a subsidized import must be the "principal" cause of
a proven injury, or whether it is sufficient that it be but one of
several asserted causes of injury. The historical GATT-based "import relief" causality standard required that proscribed importation
be the principal cause of the alleged injury.67 Since 1921, the
accompanying text.
NO. 249, supra note 3, at 89.
62. SENATEREPORT
63. Id.
64. Id. at 88.
65. Id.
66. Id. The TAA accordingly prohibits the Commission from entering a negative determination as to injury, or threat thereof, "merely because the prevailing market price is at or
above the minimum support price." 19 U. S.C. S 1677(7)(D)(i) (1982).
67. See Tokyo Round Injury Standard, supra note 8, at 120 1 .
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causality standard in U.S. antidumping laws requires that the
asserted injury be "by reason of' U.S. sales at less than fair value.G8
Because the M T N Agreements dropped the principal cause
standard, the "by reason of' U.S. standard now comports with the
G A T T as modified by the M T N Agreements. The 1979 Senate
Report states clearly that Congress did not intend for the Commission to decide whether a n otherwise countervailable import was
the "principal," "substantial" or "significant" cause of the alleged injury.69 It was sufficient that the import be one cause of material
injury or threatened material injury. The Commission should not,
this report instructs, engage in weighing the effects of proscribed
activities of an exporting nation against other benign or noncountervailable causes of injury or threatened injury to a U.S.
industry. The TAA did not contemplate "that the effects from the
subsidized imports [would] be weighed against the effects associated
with other [noncountervailable] factors.770

Nonsubsidy Factors
The 1979 Senate Report, however, provides a gloss to all these admonitions regarding export subsidies. In examining the overall injury to a domestic industry, the report directs that the Commission
"will consider information which indicates that harm is caused by
factors other than subsidized imports." 7 1 This latter authorization is
similar to the Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties which
permits the enforcement agencies of signatory nations to consider
information which "may demonstrate that the harm attributed
68. 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976) (repealed 1979).
69. SENATE
REPORT
NO. 249, supra note 3, at 57. The Senate Report continues that "[alny
such requirement would have the undesirable result of making relief more difficult to obtain
for industries facing difficulties from a variety of sources; such industries are often the most
vulnerable to subsidized imports." Id.
70. Id. The 1979 Senate Report gives examples of "other factorsnsuch as "the volume and
prices of nonsubsidized imports, contraction in demand or changes in patterns of consumption, trade restrictive practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic
producers, developments in technology, and the export performance and the productivity of
the domestic industryn which may be contributing to overall injury to an industry, but are
not to be weighed against the effect of countervailable subsidized exports. Id.
71. Id. at 58; see also id. at 88-89; HOUSEREPORT
NO. 31 7, supra note 31, at 46-47; TUDE
AGREEMENTS
ACTOF 1979, STATEMENTS
OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION,
H . R . Doc. No. 153,
pt. 2, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 435 (1979).
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. . . to the . . . subsidized imports is attributable to other factors.''72
As the following discussion will demonstrate, the Commission has
interpreted the above guidelines in a manner which has freed it to
regularly measure the effect of one or more nonsubsidy factors
against noncountervailable causes of asserted injury in determining
whether the alleged injury is "by reason of' subsidized imports or is,
on balance, "attributable to other fact0rs.'~3

Several years of countervailing duty litigation under the TAA
have produced Commission decisions that interpret the threat of
material injury standard under the TAA. In many determinations,
an affirmative finding of material injury has caused the Commission
to suspend further evaluation of whether a threat of material injury
also exists.'* The effect of this procedural practice has been a reduction in the number of Commission decisions that devote specific
discussion to the proof required to show the existence of a threat of
material injury.
Nevertheless, there are a number of preliminary and final determinations that track the statutory language and legislative history of
the threat of material injury, with an analysis distinct from that
employed in the material injury evaluation. These cases are
described below, in an effort to point out that while the Commission
looks at all the statutory and legislative criteria when making each
determination, each case before the I T C must be viewed at two
levels: the aggregate level that makes a case qualify as a threat of
material injury case, and the more specific level that involves a
search for the point at which the gravity shifts and some factors
72. Id. Note 2 to article 6, paragraph 4 of the Agreement states that signatory countries
may consider nonsubsidy factors such as "the volume and prices of nonsubsidized imports of
the products in question, contraction in demand or changes in the pattern of consumption,
trade restrictive practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic producers,
developments in technology and the export performance and productivity of the domestic
industry." Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, supra note 1, art. 6, para. 4
n.2, reprinted in M T A at 273 n.2.
73. See generally infra notes 177-201 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Cotton Shop Towels From Pakistan, Inv. No. 701-TA-202 (Preliminary),
USITC Pub. No. 1425 at 3 n.1 (Sept. 1983).
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become more important than others.
Due to the relatively small number of Commission countervailing
duty determinations that serve to illustrate the threat standard,
however, several Commission decisions involving the identical
threat standard of the TAA's antidumping provisions also will be
reviewed to better illustrate the factors considered by the
Commission in determining threat of material injury.T5

Negatiue Commission Determinations
Snow Grooming Vehiclesfrom the Federal Republic of Germany
Snow Grooming vehicle^,^^ an antidumping investigation, provides
a succinct analysis of the nature and amount of proof necessary for a
showing of threat of material injury under the TAA. This determination also provides an instructive example of how the
Commission will weigh nonimport related causes of a claimed injury
to a domestic industry to permit, where appropriate, the conclusion
that the harm suffered by a domestic industry is not "by reason OF
the importation of assertedly subsidized foreign products. 77
In this case, a petition filed by the Logan Division of DeLorean
Manufacturing Company alleged that snow grooming vehicles
imported from the Federal Republic of Germany were being or were
likely to be sold at LTFV.78 Upon review of the evidence, the
Commission observed that the relevant period of poor skiing conditions had obligated U.S. ski area operators to "postpone or forego
75. See 19 U.S.C. $9 1671, 1673 (1982) for the codification of the TAA antidumping
provisions. The TAA prescribes a "reasonable indicationn standard for making preliminary
determinations in both countervailing duty and antidumping duty cases. T h e 1979 Senate
Report states that the "committee intends the 'reasonable indication' standard to be applied
in essentially the same manner as the 'reasonable indication' standard under section
201(c)(2) of the Antidumping Act [of] 1921." SENATE
REPORT
NO. 249, supra note 3, at 49.
The ITC has adopted identical factors for consideration in both countervailing duty and
antidumping duty proceedings. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
76. No. 731-TA-36 (Preliminary), USITC Pub. No. 1117 (Dec. 1980), reprinted in 2 INT L . TRADE
REP. DEC.(BNA) 5344 (1980). O n the basis of its finding that, during the relevant time period, there were three domestic producers of the imported article subject to
investigation, the Commission determined that there was no issue of "material retardation
of the establishment of an industry in the United States." Id. at 5345 n. 1.
77. Id. at 5345.
78. Id.
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purchases of snow grooming equipment ."79 The Commission found
further that overall recessionary influences, and the relatively
u
recent creationn and introduction to the same market of an improved "super snow grooming vehicle" constituted measurable factors in
the absence of "a substantial replacement market" for the earlier
generation of snow-grooming pr0ducts.8~
Taking these factors together, the Commission found that the
decrease in the U.S. manufacturers' sales was due, in part, to "a
sharp rise in selling and administrative expenses. . . [that
occasioned] the drop in pr~fitability."~'The Commission also
received evidence that tended to establish qualitative differences
between the DeLorean product and the foreign product, and gave
weight to the testimony of purchasers of foreign products who cited
"differences in quality, service, reliability, or operating cost" of the
foreign product as their primary purchasing m o t i v a t i ~ n . ~ ~
Reviewing the evidence as a whole, the Commission concluded that
"the margin of LTFV sales, if any, is a 'technical dumping' not
proscribed by the statute, and that any decline in the [U.S.] industry's position must be the result of other causes."83
Noting that a finding of threat of material injury requires a
"showing that the threat is real and injury is imminent,"84 the
Commission also concluded that projections of anticipated U.S. and
foreign demand, together with the absence of demonstrable exporter
excess capacity, precluded a finding of imminent harm to domestic
manufacturers. Instead, the Commission found that static import
levels, absence of standing exporter inventory, long leadtime for
obtaining engines and other parts, and a "strong demand" for such
parts by European purchasers should "prevent any significant
increases in imports from West Germany."85 In these latter respects,
Snow Grooming Vehicles represents a superior example of the Commission's analysis of the augury of increased import penetration,
concluding in this instance that the prospect was small.
79. Id. at
80. Id.
81. Id. at
82. Id. at
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at

5347.
5347-48.
5348.

5348-49.
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Tantalum Electrolytic Fixed Capacitors From Japan
In Tantalum capacitor^,^^ a 1980 redetermination of an antidumping case, the Commission concluded that a Japanese company's
plans to increase its productive capacity for these capacitors did not
constitute a threat of material injury to U.S. manufacturers of like
products.87 U.S. manufacturers asserted that Japanese sales at
LTFV, combined with a planned increase in Japanese production
and attendant exports to the United States, represented an unfair
trade practice under the TAA.88
Upon review of the evidence, the Commission noted that fourteen
U.S. firms operating out of seventeen facilities produced tantalum
capacitors during 1975.89From January to June 1976, the U.S. industry experienced a degree of recovery in which production and
shipments improved 37 percent over 1975 levels. This raised the
level of U.S. production to those of earlier years which the
Commission described as "showing high capacity, utilization, sales,
production, shipments, and net profit to sales ratios of 109
percent."'J T h e Commission further found that in recent instances
of head-to-head competition between United States and Japanese
sellers, U.S. sellers secured almost 57 percent of the sales, even in a
majority of the situations where the Japanese-made capacitor was
priced lower.g1
Cognizant of evidence that Japanese producers intended to increase production, with a commensurate rise in exports to the
United States, the Commission nevertheless determined that a
foreign concern's plans to increase production and exports was not
in and of itself sufficient under the antidumping law to constitute a
threat of material injury to a domestic industry:
Consideration of Nippon Electric Company's plans to increase productive capacity for, and exportation to the United
States of, epoxy dipped tantalum capacitors in and of itself
does not establish grounds for determination of likelihood
-

-

-

-

86. Inv. No. A.4 1921- 159, USITC Pub. No. 1092 (Aug. 1980), reprinted in 2 INT'LTRADE

REP.DEC.(BNA) 5137 (1980).
87. Id. at 5137-38.
88. Id. at 5139-40.
89. Id. at 5139.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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of injury by reason of LTFV sales. We do not believe that an
increase in the capacity of Japanese producers to manufacture tantalum electrolytic fixed capacitors portended a threat
to a strong and growing industry in the United States. The
evidence gathered by the Commission regarding any increased exports from Japan did not show real and imminent
threat to the domestic industry.92
Tantalum Capacitors, it is seen, represents a successful defense by
respondents able to persuade the Commission that, far from being
imperiled, the U.S. industry was, in fact, in a resurgence permitting
it to preserve, and even enlarge, its domestic market share.
Prestressed Concrete Steel Wire Strand From Brazil
In the final determination of Prestressed Concrete Steel Wire Strand
from Brazil,93 the Commission concluded that even if the U.S. steel
industry was suffering from economic injury, such injury, or threat
thereof, was not a result of allegedly subsidized exports from
Brazil.94 For investigative purposes, the Commission found that the
pertinent "domestic industry" consisted of all U.S. producers
manufacturing prestressed concrete steel wire strand (PC ~ t r a n d ) . ~ 5
In reviewing the economic health of that industry, the Commission
92. Id. at 5140. In dissenting statements, Commissioners Moore and Bedell disagreed
with the Commission's finding of no threat of injury to the stable and growing domestic production of the subject capacitors, stating:
The projected increase in Japanese productive capacity was believed to be far in
excess of home-market demand. NEC's increased exports to the United States
were scheduled to come at a time when price competition in the U.S. market for
tantalum capacitors was intensifying, and when the domestic industry was still
struggling to recover fully from the economic recession of 1975. In our judgment,
the prospect of sharply increased exports to the United States of tantalum electrolytic fixed capacitors posed a likelihood of injury to the domestic industry in
October, 1976.

Id. at 5142.
It would be correct to question the dissenter's focus on Japanese intent to expand production "in excess of home-market demand," in recognition that such excess production is the
sine qua non of any exporting nation.
93. Inv. No. 701-TA-152 (Final), USITC Pub. No. 1358 (Mar. 1983), reprintedin ~ I N T ' L
TRADE
REP.DEC.(BNA) 1115 (1983).
94. Id. at 1116, 1120.
95. Id.

[Vol. 16:373
Heinonline - - 16 Law & Pol'y

Int'l Bus. 394 1984

CVD THREAT STANDARD

concluded that producers of PC strand generally were healthy and
enjoying increased productivity, some increased capacity, relatively
high domestic capacity utilization, increased worker compensation,
and no important changes in the number of persons empl0yed.~6
The Commission attributed a showing of recent decline in domestic
capacity utilization to the noted increased domestic productive
capacity .97 Importantly, the Commission was persuaded that the
U.S. producers competing most directly with Brazilian imports
were, in fact, "expanding v i g o r o u ~ l y . ' ~ ~
The Commission staff could not verify the petitioners' allegations
of price suppression or depression, and only two claims of domestic
sales lost to Brazilian imports appeared to be due to a lower cost of
the Brazilian product.99 As to the market penetration of Brazilian
PC strand, the market had declined slightly during the period under
investigation, and there was no showing of aggressive pricing by
Brazilian exporters intent upon increasing such market share.100
The Commission also found the absence of a showing that Brazilian
imports were increasing in either absolute or relative terms. Coupled with an insignificant level of domestic importer inventories and
lack of evidence that Brazilian producers probably would use existing excess capacity to increase exports of PC strand, the Commission concluded that the Brazilian exports posed no threat of material
injury to the U.S. industry.lO'
Certain Commuter Airplanes From Brazil
The Commission conducted a similar examination of export
trends in Certain Commuter Airplanes.102 In that action, the Commission concluded that although it was likely that the exporter in question would continue to rely substantially upon exports to the
lucrative U.S. market, "deliveries of imports from Brazil [had] not
increased."l03 As to exporter capacity, the Commission observed
that the petitioner had not presented "information on Brazilian
96. Id. at 1118.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1120.
99. Id. at 1 1 19.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1120.
102. Inv. No. 701-TA-188 (Preliminary), USITC Pub. No. 1291 (Sept. 1982), reprinted
in 4 INT'LTRADE
REP.DEC.
(BNA) 1956 (1983).
103. Id. at 1962.
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[manufacturing] capacity [or] sufficient information with respect to
the likelihood that Brazilian exports will be increasingly directed to
the United States."lO*
Together, Snow Grooming Vehicles, Tantalum C'apacitors, and Certain
Commuter Air-lanes show a Commission willingness to credit
respondents' evidence that the import trends were sufficiently static
so as not to support a conclusion that they would expand significantly, or that the putative injured party was, contrary to its claims, able
to compete successfully with the imports.
Affirmatiue Commission Determinations
Alberta Gas Chemicals, Inc. u. United States
In contrast to these negative determinations, the Commission
made an affirmative determination of threat to material injury in
Alberta Gas Chemicals,l05 a methyl alchohol antidumping proceeding.
In this case, a Canadian importer of methyl alcohol contested a
Commission antidumping order in which the Commission held that
domestic producers of methyl alchohol were likely to be injured by
increased LTFV imports from Canada.106 Key to the Commission's
finding below was its belief that Alberta would expand its productivity at some point.107 Cognizant that the pendency of Commission
enforcement proceedings and the possibility of an adverse outcome
could affect the level of future imports, the Commission majority
predicted that "the outcome of this investigation conceivably may be
a factor in the final decision of the foreign firm's expansion plans."lo8
In its final determination, the Commission concluded that "if
[Alberta Gas] has increased capacity and additional product
availability and is able to continue to sell at LTFV to the U.S.
market, the likelihood of increased penetration and injury to the
domestic market is apparent."log
104. Id.
105. Alberta Gas Chemicals, Inc. v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 780, 791 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1981), 2 INT'LTRADEREP.DEC.(BNA) 1481, 1489 (1981).
106. 515 F. Supp. at 783, ~ I N T ' L T R AREP.
D E DEC.(BNA) at 1482 (citingMethy1 Alcohol
from Canada, Inv. No. AA 1921-202, 44 Fed. Reg. 40734 Uuly 12, 1979)).
107. 515 F. Supp. at 784 (citing 44 Fed. Reg. at 40735).
108. Id.
109. Id.
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Court of International Trade's Reversal
The Commission's affirmative Final Determination was reversed,
however, by the Court of International Trade."" Contrary to the
Commission's finding, the court decided that Alberta Gas' expansion plans were (6 uncertain, n and dependent upon "several contingencies," among which was included financing. ''1 The court held
that the Commission had departed impermissibly from the 1979
Senate Report standard which required a showing that "the threat is
real and injury is imminent, not mere supposition or conjecture.""*
[Elven if AGCI has immediately decided to expand its production facilities, production in such facilities could not commence until 1982 at the earliest, assuming there were no unforeseen delays. . . . In summary, the record before the Commission shows simply a mere possibility that injury might occur at some remote future time.l13
Thus, another important factor for reversal was the court's assessment that any increase in imports would only take effect at some indefinite point in the future. l t 4
Frozen Concentrated OrangeJuice j o m Brazil
The Commission's most complete treatment of the threat of
material injury standard in a countervailing duty proceeding was set
forth in Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice,*'5 a distinctive decision in
that the Commission found that the subject imports posed a threat of
material injury without a concommitant finding of present material
injury.
The Commission proceeding on frozen concentrated
orange juice (FCOJ) commenced in December, 1982 following
110. 515 F. Supp. at 791, 2 INT'LTRADE
REP.DEC.(BNA) at 1489.
1 1 1 . Id., 2 INT'LTRADE
REP.DEC.(BNA) at 1488.
REP.DEC.(BNA) at 1488.
112. 515 F. Supp. at 790, 2 INT'LTRADE
REP.DEC.(BNA) at 1488-89.
113. 515 F. Supp. at 791, 2 INT'LTRADE
114. 515 F. Supp. at 791, 2 INT'L TRADE
REP.DEC.(BNA) at 1488.
115. Inv. No. 701-TA-184 (Final), USITC Pub. No. 1406 (July 1983), summarized in 5
INT'LTRADE
REP.DEC.(BNA) 1391 (1983).
116. Id. at 9.
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a preliminary determination by the Department of Commerce that
it had a reasonable basis to believe that the Brazilian government
was offering subsidies to Brazilian FCOJ producers and exporters.l17
In reviewing the condition of the U.S. industry, Chairman Eckes
recited the losses sustained by U.S. growers in "unprecedented
back-to-back freezes in 1980181 and 1981/82.""a Recent peak
Florida production of 206.7 million boxes in 1979-80 had declined to
172.4 million boxes in 1980-81 and to 125.8 million boxes in
1981-82. l t 9 Domestic production of FCOJ from Florida oranges
tracked these downward trends.l20 The Commission established
that the pertinent "domestic industry" included all United States
growers and processors. 121
Chairman Eckes conceded that the economic indicia of threatened injury presented multiple impediments to the ordinary assessment of pricing data, including recognition that as many U.S. processors used Brazilian FCOJ in blends with Florida FCOJ, no
means existed for relating price differentials to difference in quality.
Further, there existed in the retail orange juice market substantial
"consumer brand loyalties and competition from other juice prod u c t ~ . "For
" ~ ~these
~ reasons," Chairman Eckes wrote, "it is difficult
to trace either the present or future impact of these subsidized imports on domestic pricing, which would normally be a key indicator
in an injury analysis of agricultural c~mrnodities."l~~
While putting aside the above pricing factors, Chairman Eckes
nevertheless reached conclusions which permitted the finding that
the "threat of injury is real and injury is imminent."124Specifically,
he found that (1) past import trends indicated that Brazil could increase its FCOJ exports to the United States by 115 percent from
1978-79 through 1981-82; (2) as of the time of the investigation,
117. Id. ; Prelim. Determination, Int'l Trade Admin., U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 47 Fed.
Reg. 56,528 (1982).
118. Id. at 5.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 3. Florida growers produce "almost alln round oranges used in producing
FCOJ, and approximately 85 percent of the Florida round orange crop is used to produce
FCOJ. Id. at 5 (views of Chmn. Eckes).
122. Id. at 9.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 9-11.
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significant amounts of Brazilian FCOJ remained in U.S.
warehouses; (3) Brazilian FCOJ 1983-84 production probably
would fill Brazilian storage facilities by July 1984, the beginning of
the 1984 processing cycle; (4) Brazil's FCOJ exports demonstrated
an "increasing reliance on the U.S. market," with the U.S. share of
Brazilian exports reaching 57 percent in 1982; and (5) it was likely
that Brazil's domestic consumption of its FCOJ production would
remain "flat," at about 5 percent of Brazilian production.l25 Taken
in the aggregate, U. S. consumption trends and Brazilian export
capacity, Chairman Eckes determined, required a finding that the
Brazilian exports posed a "threat of material injury."l26 Chairman
Eckes concluded:
Given the constraints imposed by the cost and physical
limitations of storage facilities, as well as limited export
markets, the incentive is present and real to export at least
historical if not increased amounts to the United States. Exports to the United States at past levels will be injurious, as
domestic production continues to recover to pre-freeze
levels. Such imports will no longer supplement short-fall in
production, but will begin to displace recovering domestic
production. The impact of this displacement will be magnified by the fact that U.S. consumption trends have essentially been flat for the past four crop years and there is
nothing in the record which would argue any significant
change in those trend~.12~

Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice offers additional insight into the
weight which the Commission will give to the nature of the alleged
foreign subsidy in reaching its conclusions on threat of material injury. Chairman Eckes highlighted the Department of Commerce's
conclusion that the subsidies at issue -"preferential working capital
financing for exports and income tax exemption for export
earnings"- were both programs "designed to promote exports and
tied to export perf0rmance,"12~and, in a reading consistent with the
TAA, the legislative history, and the Agreement on Subsidies and
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.

at
at
at
at

10-11.
3.
12.
13; 47 Fed. Reg. 56,528 (1982).
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Countervailing Measures, "inherently more likely to threaten injury
than are other subsidies.n129

Choline Chloride From Canada and the United Kingdom
Excess capacity of the foreign exporter and declining "key indicators" of the domestic industry again were determinative to the
Commission's affirmative preliminary determination of unlawful
dumping in Choline Chloride.J30 Viewing the markets for liquid and
dry choline chloride as essentially interchangeable, the Commission
concluded that there was one domestic industry comprised of five
producers. 131 Domestic shipments had fallen consistently from 1980
to 1982, with an additional decline in the first three quarters of
1983.'3=The petitioner offered additional evidence of two domestic
producers' lowered gross profit margins and operating profit
margins during the same period. 133
Canadian exports to the United States expanded substantially
during this same period, and nearly doubled in the first threequarters of 1983, periods during which U .S. consumption declined
or showed only slight increases.134 Imports from the United
Kingdom which began in 1982 showed commensurate gains, with
much of the imported product still in U.S. inventory at the time of
the Commission investigations. '35
Of particular importance to the Commission was the fact that the
most significant Canadian producer of choline chloride recently had
made capital improvements which increased its capacity by 60 percent
Similarly, the United Kingdom producer was producing at
"less than full capacity.n137Both foreign concerns produced choline
129. Id. at 13; see Certain Tool Steels from Brazil, Inv. No. 701-TA-187, USITC Pub.
No. 1403 (July 1983).
130. Inv. Nos. 731-TA-155 and 731-TA-156 (Preliminary), USITC Pub. No. 1473
(Dec. 1983). Choline chloride is a synthetic nutritive supplement added to poultry and
swine feed to promote growth. Id. at 3.
131. Id. at 5.
132. Id. at 6 .
133. Id.
134. Id. at 7.
135. Id. at 9-10. The ratio of imports from the United Kingdom to U.S. consumption
nearly doubled from the first half of 1982 to the first half of 1983. Id.
136. Id. at 9.
137. Id. at 10.
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chloride principally for export. This "orientation toward imports,"
taken together with the accumulated inventory of exports and the
unused capacity of both exporting nations, led Chairman Eckes and
Commissioner Stern to find "a reasonable indication of threat of
material injury."138

Hot-Rolled Stainless Steel Bar from Brazil
The Commission's preliminary determination in Hot-Rolled
Stainless Steel Bar from B r a ~ i P 3affirmatively
~
found threat of material
injury from Brazilian exports of both hot-rolled and cold-formed
bar.140 The decision is an instructive example of how the Commission merges its evaluation of the threat of material injury criteria
with the criteria for material injury to permit a more thorough
assessment of all pertinent economic indicia in measuring threat of
injury. It is also a good example of the Commission's use of the ratio
of U. S. imports to U. S. consumption to weigh the effect of such imports on the domestic industry.141
The Commission determined that U.S. producers of hot-rolled
bar and cold-formed bar constituted two distinct domestic industries.142 Evidence before the Commission showed that the
economic condition of the U.S. hot-rolled bar industry deteriorated
in the 1979-81 period under investigation, with domestic shipments
down markedly and a showing of measurable negative employment
trends.143 "Hours paid" to employees-a factor the Commission
found to be "a more informative indicator" of lost employment in an
industry experiencing reduced hours and furloughs - dropped for
many responding producers, while sales, gross profits, and net profits also d e ~ 1 i n e d . l ~ ~
138. Id. at 10 n.56.
139. Inv. Nos. 701-TA-179 to 181 (Preliminary), USITC Pub. No. 1276 (August 1982).
140. Chairman Eckes and Commissioners Stern and Haggert reached this conclusion as
to the "threat of material injury" from the importation of both hot-rolled and cold-formed
bar. Id. at 5 n. 1. As to a third product, wire rod, the same Commissioners chose not to reach
the threat of material injury issue after finding "reasonable indicationn of material injury.
Id. at 5 n.2.
141. See i n f a notes 151-155 and accompanying text.
142. Id. at 9. Hot-rolled bar and cold-formed bar are semi-finished products having application in the manufacture of, interalia , pump shafts, ball bearings, automotive parts, and
medical instruments
143. Id.
144. Id. at 9-10.
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In contrast, during the 1980-81 period hot-rolled bar imports
from Brazil rose nearly 20 percent,l45 and cold-formed bar imports
by an even higher percentage.146For both products the ratio of imports from Brazil to U.S. consumption rose ~ubstantia1ly.l~~
Moreover, in the context of a strong Brazilian "export orientation,"
in particular for hot-rolled bar, and of an increase in capacity of
Brazil's producers of both hot-rolled bar and cold-formed bar, the
Commission noted that the United States had become an "increasingly attractive market" for Brazilian exports of stainless steel bar.148
This was evidenced further by the fact that Brazilian exports of hotrolled bar to the European Community had declined from 1979-81
in a proportion congruent with the increase in Brazilian exports to
the United States.149 Given the evidence, the Commission majority
concluded that petitioner had proven a reasonable indication of
threat of material injury.150
In Hot-RolledStainless Steel Bar, the Commission demonstrated that
it will weigh facts which permit it to conclude that the subject industry in the exporting country is strong, growing, and likely to enjoy a continuing excess capacity that will require consistent or increased reliance upon exports.151 In this investigation, the Commission evaluated the static and deteriorating condition of the U.S. industry in cold-formed stainless steel bar, hot-rolled stainless steel
bar, and stainless steel wire rod,152 and measured this U.S. market
against substantial increases in Brazilian exports of the same products.l53 After finding material injury to U. S. industry manufacturing these products, the Commission also concluded that the Brazil145. Id. at 1 1 . Brazilian imports of hot-rolled bar increased from 450 tons in 1980 to 536
tons in 1981. Id.
146. Id. at 15-16. Brazilian imports of cold-formedbar increased from 1,489 tons in 1979
to 2,378 tons in 1981. Id.
147. The ratio of imports of hot-rolled bar from Brazil to domestic consumption increased
from 0.9 percent in 1980 to 1.2 percent in 1981. Id. at 1 1 . Import ratios for cold-formed bar
rose from 9.3 percent in 1979 to 11.6 percent in 1980. Id. at 15.
148. Id. at 12.
149. Id. at 12- 13. Brazilian exports to the EC declined from 64 percent in 1979 and 1980
to 47 percent in 1981.
150. Id. at 13-14, 16.
151. See, e.g., id. at 11-13 (factors contributing to "material injurynor "threat of material
injuryn).
152. Id. at 9-11, 14-15, 17-18.
153. Id. at 12-13, 15-16, 18-19.
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ian industry's activities, in light of Brazil's own stable domestic needs
and in conjunction with depressed United States production,
created a "threat of material injurynto the future of U.S. industry. l5*
The Commission summarized:
[Gliven recent substantial additions to Brazil's stainless
steel making capacity and only moderate growth in domestic
stainless steel consumption, Brazil is expected to continue to
place heavy emphasis on exports in order not to create a
situation of over-capacity in its domestic industry. 155

Worthy of separate discussion are other Commission determinations that illuminate the Commission's approach to three distinct
issues: first, the extent to which the Commission is likely to find
threat of material injury prior to actual importation of the subject
goods; second, the weight the Commission attaches to the particular
nature of the asserted or proved foreign subsidization; and third, the
way in which the Commission has adopted or disregarded the suggestion in the legislative history that it not assign weight to nonimport-related causes of injury.

Threat of Material Injury
Prior to Actual Importation
The threat of material injury standard in the TAA, similar to the
"likelihood" of injury standard of the Trade Act of 1974, permits the
Commission to anticipate prospective injury to a U .S. industry, so
that the Commission has been petitioned upon occasion to impose
countervailing duties before any of the subject products have been
delivered for sale to the United States.

Elemental Sulfur-Mexico
In one antidumping proceeding antedating the TAA, the Commission signaled its willingness to find an actionable prospect of
154. Id. at 13-14, 16-17,20.
155.Id. at A-44 ("Information Obtained in the Investigationn).
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domestic injury prior to actual importation. Elemental SulfurMexico,156was an investigation under the Antidumping Act of 1921
in which the United States Tariff Commission concluded that
LTFV sale of imported elemental sulfur from Mexico was the cause
of "significant injury" to domestic facilities of U.S. producers engaged in the mining and recovery of s u l f ~ r . l 5 ~
Included in the allegations of injury by interested parties was the
claim that in addition to actual LTFV sales, domestic producers
were being injured by anticipated future sales of sulfur of Mexican
origin. In other words, the Mexican sellers' quotation of LTFV
prices for prospective orders created a separate and identifiable
threat of injury.lS8 The Tariff Commission agreed, based on the
absence of temporal limitations in the causation standard of the 1.921
Act. "When the statute speaks of 'by reason of the importation,' " the
Tariff Commission stated, "no tense is implied- i.e., no actual entry of the merchandise need have occurred."l59 Under this interpretation, LTFV "offers" may be as injurious as actual "transacti0ns."~6O
Certain Rail Passenger Cars From Canada
One determination reached after the effective date of the TAA,
Certain Rail Passenger Cars,161 comes as close as any reported Commission decision to basing its affirmative Preliminary Determina156. Elemental Sulphur-Mexico, Inv. No. AA1921-92, U.S. Tariff Comm'n Pub. No.
REP. DEC. (BNA) 5068.
484 (May 1982), reprinted in 1 INT'LTRADE
157. Id. at 5069.
158. Id. at 5073 (Statement of Reasons of Comm'rs Leonard and Young).
159. Id. (Statement of Reasons of Comm'rs Leonard and Young).
160. Id. The Tariff Commission opinion continues:
The importation, therefore, can be a potential importation, of which offers in
good faith are a clear indication. Congress was clearly aware in framing the [Antidumping] act that offers can have the same injurious effects as transaction
prices. As the Tariff Commission pointed out in its 1919 study of dumping:
Moreover, even the quotation of dumping prices, though no sales in fact be
made, may occasionally result in compelling merchants with established trade to
cut their prices in order to hold their business against threats of dumpingcompetition.

Id. (citation omitted).
161. Certain Rail Passenger Cars from Canada, Inv. No. 701-TA-182 (Preliminary),
REP. DEC. (BNA) 1325.
USITC Pub. No. 1277 (Aug. 1982), reprinted in 4 INT'LTRADE
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tion upon the mere award of a contract, as distinct from the actual
domestic delivery of the product of foreign manufacture. This action
involved a contract awarded by New York's Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) to Bombardier, Inc., of Quebec, Canada,
for the supply of components of rail cars. Bombardier represented
that while it would not export finished rail cars, it would have finished cars assembled at Barre, Vermont, from parts and components of
The petitioner, the Budd
both U.S. and foreign sub~ontractors.~6*
Co. of Troy, Michigan, a producer of rail car shells, was the unsuccessful bidder for the MTA award.163
In finding immediate material injury to Budd in the MTA award
to Bombardier for approximately 60 percent of the Authority's immediate rail car needs,l6* the Commission observed that the nature
of awards of this kind require continued purchaser resort to the same
supplier for reasons of compatibility of replacement parts and service.165On this basis the Commission offered independent grounds
for finding a threat of material injury to Budd, concluding that
"Budd's future production levels and revenues [would] be adversely
affected" should the contract be awarded to Bombardier.I6'j
In a strong dissent, Commissioner Stern argued that there is no
extant U.S. industry in manufacture of commuter rail cars because
potential U.S. entrants in fabrication of these cars depend entirely
upon the very occasional offers for bids from transit authorities.167
162. Id. at 1327.
163. Id. The Commission first determined whether Budd, as a prime contractor producing car shells, but dependent for final rail car construction upon "the products of other producers of components similar to those which will be imported," had standing as an "industry
in the United States." Id. But see id. at n. 18 (noting that current U.S. countervailing duty
law does not appear to permit the granting of relief to a prime contractor under the facts of
this case). The Commission, however, deferred further evaluation of Budd's status as a
"prime contractor" for review by the Commission in the course of its arrival at a Final Determination. Id. at 1329. The Commission also devoted substantial attention to Budd's assertion that the Canadian government offered Bombardier financing at a rate of 9.7 percent,
id. at 1328,a rate Budd had been unable to secure in financial markets in the United States
or elsewhere. Id. at 1328 & n.29.
164. Id. at 1328.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. In the words of Commissioner Stern:
There is no continuing market for rail passenger components independent of the
transit authority orders. Production takes place when an order is received. A
potential subcontractor will not produce products dedicated to the transit authori-
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Stern argued that had Budd been awarded the contract, it would
have employed Portuguese production, thereby arguably removing
the putative material injury from the statutory province of the
TAA.168

Nature of Foreign Subsidization
A significant subgroup of Commission affirmative determinations of threat of material injury emphasizes the importance of
the nature of the exporting country's export-related subsidy.169

Plastic Animal Identifiation Tags From New Zealand
In one Preliminary Determination, Plastic Animal Identification
Tags,170 the Commission tracked the threat of material injury
ty specification and maintain an inventory of the products in anticipation of being
awarded a subcontract. Until a specific order is received, a producer's facilities
will be used producing other products unrelated to passenger rail cars. In the
absence of an order for specific components, there are no domestic producers of
the like product.
Id. at 1333-34.
168. Stern stated:
Budd, unlike Pullman-Standard, would not have produced the shell in the
United States. The company does, however, produce shells domestically for other
contracts at its Red Lion, Pennsylvania, plant.
Budd would have sourced the shell for the MTA contract in Portugal. The
company's reasons for the decision to source the shell in Portugal included: the
availability of government-supported export financing in the form of buyer's
credits; the lack of capacity to manufacture additional shells at its Red Lion plant;
and the cost savings from the offshore sourcing. Having decided to produce the
shells in Portugal and finish the cars in a yet-to-be refurbished U.S. facility at
Hornell, New York, . . . [tlhere is nothing on the record to support an inference
that the Budd Company would have reconsidered the decision to source the shell
in the United States had it been able to secure domestic financing equivalent to
that received by Bombardier or, for that matter, had it been awarded the contract
by MTA. Rather, another inference is obvious. The company would have
sourced the shell in Portugal because it was more profitable than manufacturing it
in the United States. Thus, there is no foundation for treating the Budd Company
as a 'domestic' producer of shells in analyzing its negotiations with the MTA. Had
the Budd bid been successful, its domestic shell manufacturing capability would
not have been utilized.
Id. at 1334-35 (citations omitted).
169. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1982) (defining export subsidies); for a discussion of
GATT-related "exportn subsidies, see supra note 59.
170. Plastic Animal Identification Tags from New Zealand, Inv. No. 303-TA-14
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directly to the facts adduced during the investigation. It found that
during the period of the investigation, New Zealand exports of the
tags had increased substantially, and that the New Zealand
exporting firms had both the capacity and the articulated intent to
increase such exports.171With specific regard to the nature of the
export subsidy in question, the Commission found that recent
changes in the New Zealand export tax incentives program "reward
firms not only for increases in their export levels, but also for
maintenance of their export volume," 17* providing such firms with
"further incentive" to increase shipments to the United States. 173
Frozen Concentrated OrangeJuice
The particular nature of the subsidy under review was crucial as
well to the affirmative determination in Frozen Concentrated Orange
Juice.174 In that decision, Chairman Eckes cited the Department of
Commerce conclusion that the subsidies at issue-"preferential
working capital financing for exports and income tax exemption for
export earningsn-were both programs "designed to promote
exports and tied to export performance,"175and, in the language of
the TAA, the legislative history, and the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, were "inherently more likely to
threaten injury than are other subsidies."176
Nonsubsidy Factors
Relevant to Commission determinations of material injury as well
as threat of material injury is the degree to which the TAA permits
the Commission to weigh various nonsubsidy causes against the effects of subsidization in assessing actual or potential injury. The
1979 Senate Report states that Title VII of the TAA "does not
. . . contemplate that the effects from the subsidized imports . . . be
(Preliminary), USITC Pub. No. 1094 (Sept. 1980), reprinted in 2 INT'LTRADE
REP.DEC.
(BNA) 5149 (1980).
17 1 . Id. at 51 53 (Statement of Reasons of Chmn. Alberger and Comm'r Stern).
172. Id. ; see also id. at 5160 (Opinion of Vice Chmn. Calhoun).
173. Id. at 5157 (Statement of Reasons for the Afirmative Determination of Comm'rs.
Moore and Bedell).
174. Inv. No. 701-TA-184 (Final), USITC Pub. No. 1406 (July 1983); see supra notes
115-129 and accompanying text.
175. Id. at 13 (Views of Chmn. Eckes).
176. Id.
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The
weighed against the effects associated with other factors. . .
Senate drafters nevertheless do permit Commission inquiry into
various causes of alleged material injury or threat thereof to
determine if the harm is caused by factors other than the subsidized
imports."178 The TAA conforms to the GATT Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures Agreement in this regard, which
expressly permits assigning weight to nonsubsidy factors in order to
prevent "the injuries caused by other factors. . . [from being] atl~~
Commission detertributed to the subsidized i m p ~ r t s . " Several
minations adopt this approach by implication.

Fall-Harvested Round White Potatoes From Canada
In an agricultural antidumping investigation, Fall-Harvested
Round White Potatoes, the Commission was presented with a com177. The Senate Report cites as examples of nonsubsidy factors:
the volume and prices of nonsubsidized imports or imports sold at fair value, contraction in demand o r changes in patterns of consumption, trade restrictive
practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic producers,
developments in technology and the export performance and productivity of the
domestic industry which may be contributing to the overall injury to an industry
SENATE
REPORTNo. 249, supra note 3, at 57.
178. Id. at 58; seealso id. at 87-89 (discussing causation under antidumping section 77 l(7)
of the TAA, now codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (1982)). T h e 1979 House report also contains a provision for consideration of nonsubsidy factors:
Of course, in examining the overall injury being experienced by a domestic
industry, the ITC will take into account evidence presented to it which
demonstrates that the harm attributed by the petitioner to the subsidized . . .
imports is attributable to such otha factors.
HOUSEREPORTNO. 317, supra note 31, at 47 (emphasis added).
179. G A T T Agreement on Application and Interpretation, Article 6, paragraph 4,
states:
It must be demonstrated that the subsidized imports are, through the effects of the
subsidy, causing injury within the meaning of the Agreement. There may be
other factors which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and the
injuries caused by other factors must not be attributed to the subsidized imports.
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, supra note 1, art. 6, para. 4, reprintedin
M T A at 273.
180. Fall-Harvested Round White Potatoes from Canada, Inv. No. 731-TA-124
(Final), USITC Pub. No. 1463 (Dec. 1983).
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plaint that Northeastern potato growers were experiencing material
economic injury. During the period under investigation, 1980-83,
acreage harvested fell 14.8 percent, full and part-time employment
fell 15.7 percent, hours worked by persons engaged in potato operations declined 7 percent, and the number of growers reporting losses
increased.181
The Commission decided that LTFV imports of potatoes from
Canada were not "a material cause" of the conceded injury exFirst, the
perienced by Northeastern producers of these potat0es.1~~
Commission declined to find a causal link between Canadian
imports and the precarious condition of the domestic industry.183
With reference to depressed sales prices of these potatoes, the Commission found that "during the period under investigation domestic
prices and losses to the domestic industry were 'a function of
domestic production, not of increases in the volume of imports.' "'84
Turning to its evaluation of threat of material injury, the
Commission found no showing of increased Canadian exports of
these potatoes or excess Canadian capacity to generate these exports.185 TO the contrary, evidence provided to the Commission
reflected a decline in import penetration, and did not support the
growers' claim that activities of Canadian export programs would
direct potato exports to the Northeast region.186
It also is noteworthy that the Commission deliberately weighed
marketing and product factors apart from proscribed dumping or
foreign subsidization activities that, in the opinion of the Commission, contributed to the travails of the domestic industry.
Commissioners Stern and Lodwick stated that "factors such as
181. Id. at 9-10, A-33 (Table 9).
182. Id. at 1 , 3. Enumerating the four major potato types as long white, round red,
russet, and round white, and recounting the separable uses and consumer preferences
accorded each, the Commission found that round white fall-harvested potatoes constituted
the domestic "like" product competing with the Canadian imports. Id. Of round white
potatoes, 84.7 percent of domestic production is sold in the northeastern United States, with
only 1.3 percent of the demand for that regional market supplied by outside domestic producers. Id. at 7 . Furthermore, 68 percent of total U.S. imports of the round white potatoes
are also concentrated in that market. Id.
183. Id. at 4.
184. Id. at 1 1 .
185. Id. at 15-16.
186. Id. at 16.
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tighter size standards, a perceived higher quality of the Canadian
potato and more effective marketing organization among many
Canadian growers. . . contribute[d] to the competitiveness of the
Canadian product ."la7 Chairman Eckes observed that a perceived
"higher quality" of the Canadian pototoes, a more appealing color of
Prince Edward Island potatoes due to the reddish growing soil, and
the more uniform size of the Canadian product constituted "nonprice factorsn that explained the competitiveness of Canadian
potatoes, adding, "[ilt appears that the Maine potato farmers would
benefit from effective marketing organizations and a marketing
order which would assure customers more uniform size."lE8
Unprocessed Float Glass From Belgium and Italy
In another recent negative determination, Unprocessed Float
Glass,la9the issue was whether lifting existing countervailing duty
orders would create the prospect of future harm to domestic
producers of the "like" product. '90 The Commission deliberately
weighed the nonsubsidized import related problems experienced by
the domestic industry against any injury arguably associated with
importation of the foreign float glass, and concluded that no harmful
consequences would follow from lifting the prior orders.lgl
Specifically, the Commission noted that the U.S. market for imported float glass, already limited under ordinary circumstances,
was depressed further by static U. S. housing and automobile
markets and that U.S. glass consumption was further negatively
affected by "a growing trend towards down-sized homes and automobiles."192
187. Id. at 4.
188. Id. at 27. In the same vein, but while reaching a negative Preliminary
Determination, the Commission in Certain Commuter Airplanes From Brazil, Inv. No.
701-TA-188, USITC Pub. No. 1291 (Sept. 1982), reprinted in 4 INT'LTRADE
REP. DEC.
(BNA) 1956, unhesitatingly ascribed asserted lost sales to customer dissatisfaction with the
U.S. commuter aircraft producer's engine performance, engine modification, maintenance
downtime, operating costs, and aircraft durability. Id. at 12-13.
189. Inv. No. 104-TA-12, USITC Pub. No. 1344 (Feb. 1983).
190. Id. at 3.
191. Id. at 10-11, 13.
192. Id. at A-33 to A-34. In the words of the Commission,
[tlhe United States has not been a leading export market for float glass produced
by the four foreign producing firms in question.. . . U.S. demand for float glass is
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Iron Bars From Brazil
The Commission again found that asserted injury to a petitioning
domestic industry resulted mainly from factors other than import
underselling in Iron Bars from Bra.zi1.193 In that determination, the
Commission found that almost all imports of iron bars from Brazil
during the period under investigation were by one importer,
American Iron and Alloys Corp (AIA).lg4 On the basis of
information derived during its investigation, the Commission
subscribed to the petitioner's account that domestic industry performance was ccgenerally poor," including its characterization of
depressed production, capacity utilization, and shipments.lg5
Important to the gravity the Commission attached to these
downward trends, nonetheless, was a "soft market" for such products
in 1982 and the first three quarters of 1983.196
Conclusive for the Commission, however, were the nonprice
reasons for AIA's decision to purchase imported iron bars.lg7Citing
its authorization to consider nonprice factors, including restrictive
trade practices and competition between foreign and domestic producers,lg8the Commission noted that at least two U.S. producers of
the iron bar had refused to sell to AIA.199 As the other U.S. producers did not offer "full product lines," AIA "had no choice but to
seek a foreign supplier." 200 Coupled with the low U.S. market
penetration by the Brazilian imports and the limited foreign produclargely dependent on activity in the housing and automobile sectors of the
economy, both of which have been severely depressed by high interest rates. . . . In
addition to declines in housing starts and automobile production, U.S. glass consumption is also negatively affected by a growing trend toward down-sized houses
and automobiles.

Id. at A-32 to A-33.
193. Inv. No. 701-TA-208 (Preliminary), USITC Pub. No. 1472 (Dec. 1983). The relevant "domestic industrynwas found to be all U.S. producers of continuous cast iron bars. Id.
at 4.
194. Id. at 6, 7.
195. Id. at 4.
196. Id. at 5.
197. Id. at 6-8.
198. Id. at 6 & n.26.
199. Id. at 7.
200. Id.
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tion capacity, the Commission found that Petitioner had failed to
establish any reasonable indication of threat of material injury.20'

Even conceding the elasticity of various interpretations available
to the threat of material injury standard, the language of the standard, even if not precise, does represent a sufficiently intelligible
principle, including articulation of congressional policy, with
standards adequate to test and guide its execution.

Conformity with Statutory and GA TT Criteria
Incorporating by reference its definition of material injury, the
statute requires that an actionable threat of material injury pose a
threat of harm "which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant.'qo2 Also adopted by reference is the guideline of article 6 of
the Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, which states that
a determination of threat of material injury must be made by "objective examination of both (a) the volume of subsidized exports and
their effect on prices in the domestic market for like products, and
(b) the consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of
such products.'q03 Lastly, weighing the presence or absence of threat
of material injury, the TAA directs the Commission to consider the
nature of the subsidy, and the effects likely to be caused by the
subsidy, particularly where "the subsidy is an export subsidy inconsistent with the Agreement.'qo4 Read in conjunction with article 6 of
the Subsidies Code and the Agreement Annex,205 which describes
export subsidies deemed inherently suspect and effectively per se
countervailable, the threat of material injury language provides an
adequate expression of congressional policy, with accompanying
201. Id. at 8.
202. 19 U.S.C. 5 1677(7) (1982).
203. Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, supra note 1 , art. 6, para. 1 ,
reprinted in MTA at 272.
204. 19 U . S . C . 5 1677(7)(E); see supra note 59 and accompanying text.
205. Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, supra note 1 , Annex, reprinted in
MTA at 295.
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guidelines, to constitute a lawful delegation irrespective of the
"mumbo-jumbo" characterization of some critics.206

Commission Application of Threat Factors
The above discussion warrants the conclusion that for the most
part, the Commission intelligently has applied the threat of material
injury factors, specifically (1) the condition of the domestic industry;
(2) the condition of the exporting industry; (3) the nature of the subsidization; and (4) causation.207The commission analyzed the condition of the domestic industry as reflected in the production, sales,
market share, profits, and productivity indicia required by the
TAA208in Frozen Concentrated OrangeJuice 209 and Fall-Harvested Round
' ~ to the condition of the exporting industry and
White P o t a t o e ~ . ~As
the likelihood of increased exports, Choline Chloride 2'' and Hot-Rolled
Stainless Steel Bar '2 and Plastic Animal Identijkation Tags 2 l are in formative examples of the Commission's sensitivity to growing export
capacity and export orientation of the exporting nation.
Concerning the weight to be attached to the nature of the alleged
206. The material injury standard, and aforiiorari the "threat of material injury" standard,
have been described as opaque and perhaps unintelligible, even by those responsible for administering the countervailing duty laws. But U.S. endorsement of these opaque standards
was explained as politically necessary to "bridge the gapn between the divergent interests of
U.S. industry proponents of aggressive countervailing duty enforcement and the interests
of U.S. foreign trading partners. Many U.S. trading partners considered U.S. countervailing duties to be a means of erecting nontariff barriers to foreign exportation to the United
States and of penalizing foreign exporters for manufacturing or other efficiencies achieved
in the exportation to the united ~ i a t e s By
. this analysis, the language resulting from this
political compromise was satisfactory neither to the United States nor to its trading partners
and was "no more than mumbo-jumbom-"essentially meaningless." Greenwald, supra note
6, at 39-40.
207. See 19 U.S.C. § 1667(7) (1982); S. REP. NO. 249, supra note 3, at 86-89.
208. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C).
209. Inv. No. 701-TA-184(Final), USITC Pub. No. 1406Uuly 1983), reprintedin 5 INT'L
TRADE
REP. DEC.(BNA) 1391 (1983).
210. Inv. No. 731-TA-124 (Final), USITC Pub. No. 1463 (Dec. 1983).
21 1. Inv. Nos. 731-TA-155 & 731-TA-156 (Preliminary), USITC Pub. No. 1473 (Dec.
1983).
212. Inv. Nos. 701-TA-179 to 181 (Preliminary), USITC Pub. No. 1276 (Aug. 1982),
reprinted in 4 INT'LTRADE
DEC. REP. (BNA) 1131 (1982).
2 13. Inv. No. 303-TA-14 (Preliminary), USITC Pub. No. 1094 (Sept. 1980), reprinted in
2 INT'LTRADE
DEC. REP. (BNA) 5149 (1980).
-

~
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subsidization, Chairman Eckes' review of working capital financing
in Frozen Concentrated OrangeJuice 214 and the Commission's examination of commercially unjustifiable low financing in Certain Rail
Passenger Cars 215 demonstrate Commission attentiveness to exportoriented subsidization. Lastly, with respect to the causation requirement that the threat of material injury standard "by reason of' the
allegedly subsidized imports, Prestressed Concrete Steel Wire Strand 216
and Certain Commuter Airplanes 21' shows that the Commission will
decline to make an affirmative determination of threat of material
injury when the reversals suffered by the domestic industry are fairly
attributable to other causes.

Commission Departure from TAA and G A T T Criteria
The single current area of Commission countervailing duty enforcement to depart measurably from the policy of the GATT and
the Code pertains to the levying of countervailing duties upon products not yet actually imported to the United States. The 1979
Senate Report conceded that the TAA requirement that alleged injury be "not inconsequential" might represent a lower injury
threshold than that provided for by the GATT,21* and the pre-TAA
antidumping determination in Elemental Sulfur-Mexico found that the
"by reason of the importation" causation language of the TAA permitted antidumping enforcement prior to actual importation of a
product.219 The post-TAA countervailing duty determination in
Certain Rail Passenger Cars, in turn, based its affirmative countervailing duty determination upon the New.York MTA's award of a contract to Canada's Bombadier, a contract award made substantially
prior

214. Inv. No. 701-TA-184(Final), USITC Pub. No. 1406Uuly 1983), reprintedin ~ I N T ' L
TRADE
DEC. REP. (BNA) 1391 (1983).
215. Inv. No. 701-TA-182, USITC Pub. No. 1277 (Aug. 1982), reprinted in 4 INT'L
TRADE
REP. DEC. (BNA) 1325 (1982).
216. Inv. No. 701-TA-152 (Final), USITC Pub. No. 1358 (Mar. 1983), reprinted in 5
INT'LTRADE
DEC. REP. (BNA) 1115 (1983).
21 7. Inv. No. 701-TA-188 (Preliminary), USITC Pub. No. 1291 (Sept. 1982), reprinted
in 4 INT'LTRADE
REP. DEC. (BNA) 1956 (1982).
2 18. See SENATEREPORTN o . 249, supra note 3, at 36; see supra note 42 and accompanying
text.
219. Inv. No. AA 1921-92, TariffComm'n Pub. No. 484 (May 1972), reprintedin 1 INT'L
TRADE
REP. DEC. (BNA) 5068 (1972).
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in time to any domestic delivery of the rail cars.2Z0
Such an interpretation of the "by reason of the importation"
language of the TAA has no support in the TAA, its legislative
history, or the G A T T as it has been interpreted. Paragraph 3 ,
Article VI of the G A T T unambiguously limits countervailable products to products "imported" into the territory of another contracting party, while paragraph 6(a) of the G A T T makes it clear that to
be countervailable, it is the actual "importation" of the product that
must "cause or threaten material injury.'"2l Congruent with this
policy, article 6 of the Subsidies and Countervailing Duties
Agreement requires "positive evidence" following "an objective
examination of both (a) the volume of subsidized imports and their
effect on prices in the domestic market for like products, and (b) the
consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of such
products .'"22
The decisions in Elemental Sulfur-Mexico and Certain Rail Passenger
Carsfrom Canada evidence the Commission's view that it may impose
countervailing duties prior to actual importation on the basis that
pre-import sanctions vindicate the preventive purposes of the threat
of material injury standard, interpreted by the 1979 Senate Report
to countenance countervailing duties "so as to prevent actual injury
from occurring.'?23 That reading, however, cannot be reached consistently with either the Court of International Trade's reversal of
Alberta Gas Chemicals, proscribing Commission antidumping enforcement premised upon the possibility of future injurious
imports,224 or with the G A T T and the Agreement on Interpretation
requirements of actual importation. If Commission interpretation
of the threat of material injury standard is to complement that of the
G A T T and the Agreement on Interpretation, without stretching the
"imports" and "importation" language of those two instruments
beyond recognition, the threat of material injury standard must be
reviewed from the vantage point of actual importation.

220. Inv. No. 701-TA-182, USITC Pub. No. 1277 (Aug. 1982), reprinted in 4 INT'L
TRADE
REP.DEC.(BNA) 1325 (1982).
221. GATT, supra note 1 , Art. VI, paras. 3 & 6(a).
222. Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, supra note 1 , Art. 6 , para. 1 ,
reprinted in MTA at 272.
223. SENATE
REPORT
NO.249, supra note 3, at 88-89; seesupra text accompanying note 44.
224. 515 F . Supp. 780 (1981).
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However arguably elusive the TAA's threat of material injury
standard may be, the Commission has marshalled effectively, with
only one significant exception, a coherent, predictable, and supportable enforcement policy thereunder. Rather than permit the threat
standard to provide an expedient loophole for imposition of countervailing duties in cases presenting intricate and difficult economic
variables, or resorting to affirmative findings of threat of material
injury in instances in which there may exist significant political
pressure to do so, the Commission decisions have conformed closely
to the guidelines of the TAA, the legislative history, and the G A T T
with its accompanying codes, protocols, and agreements. In doing
so, the Commission's exegesis of the threat of material injury standard, and the proof necessary thereunder, consistently has been
attentive to the analysis of import trends, the predictable effects of
such imports upon the domestic industry, and the nature of the
foreign subsidies under review.
O n this basis it may be fairly concluded that Commission enforcement of the countervailing duty law effectively refutes the critics
who label the material injury and threat of material injury standards
as unintelligible and not susceptible of predictable enforcement. T o
the contrary, to date the Commission's enforcement of these standards under the TAA has served to further the national goal of
fairness in international trade by minimizing the potential for
capricious imposition of countervailing duties, while at the same
time providing lucid and evenhanded standards for U.S. and
foreign businesses alike.
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